J'ai pas compté mais j'ai du faire un topo à plus de 1000 personnes depuis 1 an et demi (au moins trois personnes par jour) parfois 20 par jour... Dans mon quartier les AI m'adorent...

ce que j'aime en France c'est ces soutiens inconditionnel du bas du panier , on aime les gentils losers

Hyman Minsky avait raison
La tribune 20/08/2007

"Hyman Minsky avait raison" : voilà l'exclamation que lancent les observateurs de la crise financière des crédits hypothécaires pour peu qu'ils apprécient la recherche académique. Mais qui est donc Hyman Minsky ?

L'homme est décédé en 1996, à l'age de 77 ans. Il a consacré sa vie à la recherche économique en s'inspirant d'observations pragmatiques et des travaux de Keynes et de Schumpeter. L'un des thèmes de ses travaux qui sonne particulièrement juste aujourd'hui concerne ce qu'il a appelé une "hypothèse d'instabilité financière" dans un papier publié en 1992.

L'idée est que les professions financières (banquiers mais aussi toute sorte d'intermédiaires) cherche à maximiser leurs profits en proposant des produits de financement innovants. Cette recherche de profits conduit à une accélération de la distribution de crédit et, autre effet quasi-simultané, à un accroissement des prix de certains actifs (l'immobilier dans la crise actuelle).

Hyman Minsky identifie trois groupes de personnes morales ou physiques qui vont profiter de ces innovations financières : "Hedge unit, speculative unit et Ponzi unit" que l'on peut traduire en bon français par "acheteur rassurant", "spéculateur" et "fraudeur en pyramide". L'acheteur rassurant est celui qui va emprunter une portion seulement du bien qu'il souhaite acquérir.

Ses fonds propres sont confortables et le rendement qu'il tirera de son bien, éventuellement par une location, sera suffisant pour rembourser le capital et régler les intérêts. Les spéculateurs sont un peu plus ambitieux. Ils empruntent plus, disposent de moins de fonds propres et ne peuvent assurer que le paiement des intérêts, sans remboursement du principal.

Ce dernier est refinancé, à échéance du premier emprunt, par la contraction d'un autre prêt. Le fraudeur en pyramide n'est pas capable de payer les intérêts et encore moins de rembourser le principal. Ils ont recours à la capitalisation des intérêts et ne peuvent espérer gagner de l'argent qu'en trouvant quelqu'un qui voudra bien leur racheter leur bien plus cher qu'ils ne l'ont payé.

Cette théorie a trouvé un merveilleux champ d'application aux Etats-Unis grâce à l'innovation propre aux banquiers new-yorkais mais aussi grâce au phénomène de mondialisation financière. D'aucuns ont utilisé les théories d'Hyman Minsky pour décrire le mécanisme d'une crise financière en six étapes.
Pour la première étape, il faut une innovation de rupture.

Cela peut concerner la technologie (Internet), un changement de politique macro-économique (ouverture des frontières, augmentation du commerce mondial), une modification de la politique de taux d'intérêt ou une fameuse innovation financière comme la titrisation des créances hypothécaires et leur repackaging en Collaterized Debt Obligation (CDO).

Pendant la seconde étape, les prix des actifs concernés commencent à monter (sociétés technologiques, valeurs des pays émergents, immobilier résidentiel américain). La dynamique de hausse devient rapidement visible par un plus grand nombre d'investisseurs.

Lors de la troisième étape, le crédit peu cher et largement distribué fait son apparition. Il peut prendre plusieurs formes comme celle des prétendus venture capitalists qui ont financé le gonflement bulle Internet, ou celle des banques quasi-nationales des pays émergents d'Asie qui ont financé leurs champions nationaux.

Cette phase d'accélération par le crédit aboutit à l'étape euphorique : les prix des actifs ne cessent d'augmenter et servent de garantie soi-disant solide pour emprunter de nouveaux fonds. Les spéculateurs et les fraudeurs à la pyramide en sont la cause mais aussi les financiers.

Aux Etats-Unis et au cours des trois dernières années, les banques américaines et les organismes de financement ont distribué des crédits à des gens auxquels elles n'auraient jamais prêté un cent 10 ans plus tôt. Il est vrai que ces derniers ont perdu toute réserve, bombardés qu'ils étaient de publicités ou de "succes stories" (J'ai fait fortune dans l'immobilier sans un sou en poche).

Cette euphorie n'empêche pas certains de garder la tête froide et de se retirer à temps de la table du casino. C'est la cinquième étape, celle de la vente des initiés qui permet aux prix des actifs de se stabiliser. Peu à peu, ils déclinent, les mauvaises nouvelles s'empilent, les spéculateurs et les fraudeurs à la pyramide sortent du jeu est c'est la sixième étape, celle de la répulsion.

Pour être juste, et si on considère uniquement l'innovation financière des CDO, les grands investisseurs institutionnels américains se sont retirés de ce marché fin 2003. Le super-carburant du cycle de Minsky faisant défaut, l'immobilier américain aurait du connaître un ralentissement plus ou moins prononcé dès 2004.

S'il a été repoussé en 2007, c'est que les banques américaines ont su trouver d'autres types d'investisseurs institutionnels pour acheter leurs fameux CDO, notamment les banques des pays qui disposent de larges surplus commerciaux. Ainsi, ce n'est pas un hasard si les banques allemandes IKB et SachsenLB en font aujourd'hui les frais. Elles ne seront pas les seules.

Pascal Boulard

The Financial Instability Hypothesis
by
Hyman P. Minsky*
Working Paper No. 74
May 1992
*The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College
Prepared for Handbook of Radical Political Economy, edited by Philip Arestis and Malcolm Sawyer, Edward Elgar:
Aldershot, 1993.
The financial instability hypothesis has both empirical and
theoretical aspects. The readily observed empirical aspect is
that, from time to time, capitalist economies exhibit inflations
and debt deflations which seem to have the potential to spin out
of control. In such processes the economic system's reactions to
a movement of the economy amplify the movement--inflation feeds
upon inflation and debt-deflation feeds upon debt-deflation.
Government interventions aimed to contain the deterioration seem
to have been inept in some of the historical crises. These
historical episodes are evidence supporting the view that the
economy does not always conform to the classic precepts of Smith
and Walras: they implied that the economy can best be understood
by assuming that it is constantly an equilibrium seeking and
sustaining system.
The classic description of a debt deflation was offered by
Irving Fisher (1933) and that of a self-sustaining
disequilibrating processes by Charles Kindleberger (1978).
Martin Wolfson (1986) not only presents a compilation of data on
the emergence of financial relations conducive to financial
instability, but also examines various financial crisis theories
of business cycles.
As economic theory, the financial instability hypothesis is
an interpretation of the substance of Keynes's "General Theory".
This interpretation places the General Theory in history. As the
General Theory was written in the early 193Os, the great
financial and real contraction of the United States and the other
1
capitalist economies of that time was a part of the evidence the
theory aimed to explain. The financial instability hypothesis
also draws upon the credit view of money and finance by Joseph
Schumpeter (1934, Ch.3) Key works for the financial instability
hypothesis in the narrow sense are, of course, Hyman P. Minsky
(1975, 1986).
The theoretical argument of the financial instability
hypothesis starts from the characterization of the economy as a
capitalist economy with expensive capital assets and a complex,
sophisticated financial system. The economic problem is
identified following Keynes as the "capital development of the
economy," rather than the Knightian "allocation of given
resources among alternative employments." The focus is on an
accumulating capitalist economy that moves through real calendar
time.
The capital development of a capitalist economy is
accompanied by exchanges of present money for future money. The
present money pays for resources that go into the production of
investment output, whereas the future money is the "profits"
which will accrue to the capital asset owning firms (as the
capital assets are used in production). As a result of the
process by which investment is financed, the control over items
in the capital stock by producing units is financed by
liabilities--these are commitments to pay money at dates
specified or as conditions arise. For each economic unit, the
liabilities on its balance sheet determine a time series of prior
2
payment commitments, even as the assets generate a time series of
conjectured cash receipts.
This structure was well stated by Keynes (1972) :
There is a multitude of real assets in the world which
constitutes our capital wealth - buildings, stocks of
commodities, goods in the course of manufacture and of
transport, and so forth. The nominal owners of these
assets, however, have not infrequently borrowed money
(Keynes' emphasis) in order to become possessed of them. To
a corresponding extent the actual owners of wealth have
claims, not on real assets, but on money. A considerable
part of this financing takes place through the banking
system, which interposes its guarantee between its
depositors who lend it money, and its borrowing customers to
whom it loans money wherewith to finance the purchase of
real assets. The interposition of this veil of money
between the real asset and the wealth owner is an especially
marked characteristic of the modern world."(p.l51)
This Keynes "veil of money" is different from the Quantity
Theory of money "veil of money." The Quantity Theory "veil of
money" has the trading exchanges in commodity markets be of goods
for money and money for goods: therefore, the exchanges are
really of goods for goods. The Keynes veil implies that money is
connected with financing through time. A part of the financing
of the economy can be structured as dated payment commitments in
which banks are the central player. The money flows are first
from depositors to banks and from banks to firms: then, at some
later dates, from firms to banks and from banks to their
depositors. Initially, the exchanges are for the financing of
investment, and subsequently, the exchanges fulfill the prior
commitments which are stated in the financing contract.
In a Keynes "veil of money" world, the flow of money to
firms is a response to expectations of future profits, and the
3
flow of money from firms is financed by profits that are
realized. In the Keynes set up, the key economic exchanges take
place as a result of negotiations between generic bankers and
generic businessmen. The documents "on the table" in such
negotiations detail the costs and profit expectations of the
businessmen: businessmen interpret the numbers and the
expectations as enthusiasts, bankers as skeptics.
Thus, in a capitalist economy the past, the present, and the
future are linked not only by capital assets and labor force
characteristics but also by financial relations. The key
financial relationships link the creation and the ownership of
capital assets to the structure of financial relations and
changes in this structure. Institutional complexity may result
in several layers of intermediation between the ultimate owners
of the communities' wealth and the units that control and operate
the communities' wealth.
Expectations of business profits determine both the flow of
financing contracts to business and the market price of existing
financing contracts. Profit realizations determine whether the
commitments in financial contracts are fulfilled--whether
financial assets perform as the pro formas indicated by the
negotiations.
In the modern world, analyses of financial relations and
their implications for system behavior cannot be restricted to
the liability structure of businesses and the cash flows they
entail. Households (by the way of their ability to borrow on
4
credit cards for big ticket consumer goods such as automobiles,
house purchases, and to carry financial assets), governments
(with their large floating and funded debts), and international
units (as a result of the internationalization of finance) have
liability structures which the current performance of the economy
either validates or invalidates.
An increasing complexity of the financial structure, in
connection with a greater involvement of governments as
refinancing agents for financial institutions as well as ordinary
business firms (both of which are marked characteristics of the
modern world), may make the system behave differently than in
earlier eras. In particular, the much greater participation of
national governments in assuring that finance does not degenerate
as in the 1929-1933 period means that the down side vulnerability
of aggregate profit flows has been much diminished. However, the
same interventions may well induce a greater degree of upside
(i.e. inflationary) bias to the economy.
In spite of the greater complexity of financial relations,
the key determinant of system behavior remains the level of
profits. The financial instability hypothesis incorporates the
Kalecki (1965)-Levy (1983) view of profits, in which the
structure of aggregate demand determines profits. In the
skeletal model, with highly simplified consumption behavior by
receivers of profit incomes and wages, in each period aggregate
profits equal aggregate investment. In a more complex (though
still highly abstract) structure, aggregate profits equal
5
aggregate investment plus the government deficit. Expectations
of profits depend upon investment in the future, and realized
profits are determined by investment: thus, whether or not
liabilities are validated depends upon investment. Investment
takes place now because businessmen and their bankers expect
investment to take place in the future.
The financial instability hypothesis, therefore, is a theory
of the impact of debt on system behavior and also incorporates
the manner in which debt is validated. In contrast to the
orthodox Quantity Theory of money, the financial instability
hypothesis takes banking seriously as a profit-seeking activity.
Banks seek profits by financing activity and bankers. Like all
entrepreneurs in a capitalist economy, bankers are aware that
innovation assures profits. Thus, bankers (using the term
generically for all intermediaries in finance), whether they be
brokers or dealers, are merchants of debt who strive to innovate
in the assets they acquire and the liabilities they market. This
innovative characteristic of banking and finance invalidates the
fundamental presupposition of the orthodox Quantity Theory of
money to the effect that there is an unchanging "money" item
whose velocity of circulation is sufficiently close to being
constant: hence, changes in this money's supply have a linear
proportional relation to a well defined price level.
Three distinct income-debt relations for economic units,
which are labeled as hedge, speculative, and Ponzi finance, can
be identified.
Hedge financing units are those which can fulfill all of
their contractual payment obligations by their cash flows: the
greater the weight of equity financing in the liability
structure, the greater the likelihood that the unit is a hedge
financing unit. Speculative finance units are units that can
meet their payment commitments on "income account" on their
liabilities, even as they cannot repay the principle out of
income cash flows. Such units need to "roll over" their
liabilities: (e.g. issue new debt to meet commitments on maturing
debt). Governments with floating debts, corporations with
floating issues of commercial paper, and banks are typically
hedge units.
For Ponzi units, the cash flows from operations are not
sufficient to fulfill either the repayment of principle or the
interest due on outstanding debts by their cash flows from
operations. Such units can sell assets or borrow. Borrowing to
pay interest or selling assets to pay interest (and even
dividends) on common stock lowers the equity of a unit, even as
it increases liabilities and the prior commitment of future
incomes. A unit that Ponzi finances lowers the margin of safety
that it offers the holders of its debts.
It can be shown that if hedge financing dominates, then the
economy may well be an equilibrium seeking and containing system.
In contrast, the greater the weight of speculative and Ponzi
finance, the greater the likelihood that the economy is a
deviation amplifying system. The first theorem of the financial
7
instability hypothesis is that the economy has financing regimes
under which it is stable, and financing regimes in which it is
unstable. The second theorem of the financial instability
hypothesis is that over periods of prolonged prosperity, the
economy transits from financial relations that make for a stable
system to financial relations that make for an unstable system.
In particular, over a protracted period of good times,
capitalist economies tend to move from a financial structure
dominated by hedge finance units to a structure in which there is
large weight to units engaged in speculative and Ponzi finance.
Furthermore, if an economy with a sizeable body of speculative
financial units is in an inflationary state, and the authorities
attempt to exorcise inflation by monetary constraint, then
speculative units will become Ponzi units and the net worth of
previously Ponzi units will quickly evaporate. Consequently,
units with cash flow shortfalls will be forced to try to make
position by selling out position. This is likely to lead to a
collapse of asset values.
The financial instability hypothesis is a model of a
capitalist economy which does not rely upon exogenous shocks to
generate business cycles of varying severity. The hypothesis
holds that business cycles of history are compounded out of (i)
the internal dynamics of capitalist economies, and (ii) the
system of interventions and regulations that are designed to keep
the economy operating within reasonable bounds.
References
Fisher, Irving. 1933. "The Debt Deflation Theory of Great
Depressions." Econometrica 1: 337-57
Kalecki, Michal 1965. Theory of Economic Dynamics. London: Allen
and Unwin
Keynes, John Maynard, 1936. The General Theory of Employment,
Interest, and Money. New York: Harcourt Brace.
Keynes, John Maynard. 1972. Essays in Persuasion,The Collected
Writings of John Maynard Keynes, Volume IX. MacMillan, St.
Martins Press, for the Royal Economic Society, London and
Basingstoke, p 151
Kindleberger, Charles 1978. Manias, Panics and Crashes. New York,
Basic Books
Levy S. Jay and David A. 1983. Profits And The Future of
American Society. New York, Harper and Row
Minsky, Hyman P. 1975. John Maynard Keynes. Columbia University
Press.
Minsky, Hyman P. 1986. Stabilizing An Unstable Economy. Yale
University Press.
Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1934. Theory of Economic Development.
Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press
Wolfson, Martin H. 1986. Financial Crises. Armonk New York, M.E.
Sharpe Inc.